Aircraft carrier
Desperate War of Japan in the Pacific
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 Reform of IJN Kaga and Akagi
Kaga Reformed
KagaReformed Kaga
IJN aircraft carriers Kaga and Akagi had three flight decks like steps originally. IJN might thougt of RN two step-flight decks carrier, so IJN increased one more flight deck. But IJN found that two flight decks were no use. So Kaga reformed the three flight decks into a plain deck on 25 June 1935. Akagi reformed on 31 August 1938. Its reform and modernization took almost three years. It spent much money, I think. Akagi and Kaga increased aircraft number 90 to carry, originally were 60.[11] They also adopted island type bridge.

USN aircraft carriers Lexington and Saratoga had have a plain deck each originally. The photo shows that T4M-1 torpedo aircraft takes off in 1929[12]

 IJN landing light array
USN LSOlight array
Landing on deck of aircraft carrier became difficult, because landing speed was faster. USN adopted LSOs in WWII. IJN adopted light array guidance system. The modeled photo shows that Zuikaku had one. The principle was that a pilot confirmed flight path on seeing 2 light arrays. If the light direction of arrays coincides, it is on a right path.
Koku Bokan no Hacchaku Shien

 Syokaku class and Essex class
Launch time tableFlight decks

IJN and USN began design of new class of fleet type aircraft carrier almost at the same time just after the end of Washington Treaty. IJN launched Syokaku class a year eariler than USN Essex class. While USN ordered building 22 aircraft carrier Essex class on 3 July 1940. US decided war in the Pacific. Because Germany and Italian naval air force was negligible. Japan had to win the Pacific War before USN Essex class aircraft carriers launched. Strangely IJNGS planned building only 3 regular aircraft carriers in spring 1941, and 18 aircraft carriers on 30 June 1942, waking up the defeat of Midway[2]. USN launched 6 aircraft carriers of Essex class in 1943, while IJN launched only one light aircraft carrier in the same year. The left time table shows them. No1 horizontal line of the time table means the Midway battle. Also No2, No3, No4 means the south Pacific, the Mariana and the Phillipines battle each.

The drawing of top view shows both of the side elevator and the landing device. Although both of them were almost the same displacement, Essex class had a wider flight deck than Syokaku class. But USN invented side elevator which was efficient while landing or taking off. Otherwise IJN invented light array landing device equipped at stern. So you can see much arresting wires of Essex class than Syokaku class. Lady Sarah was equipped with arresting wires even aft. The Essex class was equipped with 2 new type catapults bow.
Gunzo p83-88, No76
Syokaku gata kokubokan ni kansuru sasaina kodawari
Design History
Essex Class Aircraft Carrier Data

 Fire control
Layout of Essex classIJN Taiho

IJN armored aircraft carrier, Taiho exploded because of leaked gaseous aviation fuel in the Mariana Battle. The explosion destroyed fire control equipment. It could not cease fire as Akagi and Kaga in the Midway Battle. Taiho's keel was laid down at Kobe of Mitsubishi in July 1941 and Taiho was comissioned on 7 March 1944. The Essex class could fill water in an aviation fuel stowage in a case of emergency, if the fire control equipment endured after explosion. The drawing shows the lay out of Essex class. The two gray painted parts at the bottom of the hull were the stowages of aviation fuel. How did IJN try controlling fire?
IJN aircraft carrier countermeasure
MidwayFilled water outside of stowages of aviation fuel
MarianaMade bulge outside of stowages of aviation fuel and filled concrete
Closed pipes of empty stowage of aviation fuel
Powered up ventilation of hangar[1]
I suppose the last measure of ventilation had to be done at once after the Midway Battle. USN aircraft carriers had open hangars. However, IJN could not invent systematic ASW and CIC for CAP. This is the most important to think difference between IJN and USN. After the Pacific War, Japanese management took very interest in OR and system engineering. Although Japanese people learned the skill enough, I feel something different. Mind seems to work different.

 Rebuilding as auxiliary aircraft carriers
Unyou Before
IJN UnyouBefore Unyou
IJN had planned rebuilding auxiliary aircraft carriers at war time from merchant ships in 1936. Government published —DG‘DŒš‘’•¬Ž{έ to apply excellent merchant ships for IJN aircraft carriers in 1937. The ships was being built under the regulation of IJN standard soon. IJN built 7 auxiliary aircraft carriers. Taiyou, Unyou and Chuyou ferried approximate 2,000 aircraft 52 times around the Pacific[4]. One of them is IJN Unyou. Unyou was Yahata or Hachiman Maru of Nippon Yusen. Yahata Maru was a liner for Japan-Europe line. It could not run the line because of war in Europe. So She ran for North Amereica,
    1940Aug26 Seattle
    1940Nov11 San Francisco
    1940Dec24 ‘ε˜A
    1941Feb04 San Francisco
    1941Apr08 San Francisco
    1941Jun18 San Francisco[3]
Nippon Yusen stopped Hong Kong-San Francisco line on 18 July 1941. She had anchored at Kobe. IJN hired her on 21 November 1940. IJN rebuilt her at Kure Arsenal on 31 May 1942. IJN bought her on 1 August. She became IJN Unyou. She ferried IJN and IJA aircraft for Truk, Rabaul, Bismark, Palau and Surabaya 25 times till January 1944.
    I remember that San Francisco was a typical city of the North America among Japanese people. We said, "Hana no San Francisco" It meant San Francisco is like flower. I also remember a phrase of old American pop. "If you are going to San Francisco..." Most people adored San Francisco than New York. San Francisco was a gate to the US for Japanese people for a long time. But Los Angeles is a typical US city now. She looks a city of violence and drug for Japanese commons.

The Pacific War was to get air control of isolated airbases whether Japan or US won air battles. Both IJN and USN prepared for merchant ships to rebuild for them at the same time. USN rebuilt USS Long Island for 88 days only. RN spent 6 months to rebuild HMS Audacity. IJN spent a year and half to rebuild Jyunyo which was originally a big cruising merchant ship of 27,000 GT. Jyunyo worked well at the South Pacific Battle on 27 October 1942. RN began rebuilding German merchant ship Hanover for an auxiliary aircraft carrier in January 1941. Looking up the dates when RN and USN launched escort aircraft carriers at peak, RN was in August 1943 and USN was in June 1944. Both UK and US would think the win of the Atlantic and the Pacific each then. Halsey reported Stark to rebuild auxiliary aircraft carriers in December 1940.
Gunzo, p107, No.45
Goeikubo, p111-116

    Sangamon class
    USN rebuilt 4 T2 type oilers of 10,100 gross ton as auxiliary aircraft carriers. The first USS Sangamon (CVE-26) was recommisioned on 25 August 1943. It took half a year to rebuild her. The Sangamon was equipped with a new type radar which was capable for precise intercepting enemy aircraft. Aircarft Squadrons changed -37 from -26. USS Sangamon, CVE-26 did CAP 50 mile in the south of Okinawa. She moved to Sakishma Islands to attend air raids of Miyako Island on Apr 9th and 18th.
 Escort aircraft carriers in Philippines
IJA and IJN were to cooperate with attacks against US landign convoys at full length. But a staff of GF admitted that Kurita would not assault the Leyte Gulf. I suppose he thought of battles of the Solomons. IJN did not allow a commander or a captain of valuable warship abandon ship.

14 CVEs of the Casablanca class worked as CAP of Task Force 77. Other 8 CVEs worked as aircraft suppliers of fast aircraft carriers strike force. The 7th fleet and 3rd fleet of USN also were to cooperate the operation for the first time. 18 CVEs took part in the landing operation. Standard composite squadron had 16 FM-2 and 12 TBM-1. All the FM-2 of the both fleets were 247. Japan saw landing troops comming to Leyte on October 17, and ordered Operation Syo-1 on 19. USA began to land on October 20. However, intercepting fleet and aircraft of IJN delayed in action on 22. C. Sprague of 6 CVEs and 3 destroyers, and 4 destoryers escorts showed excellent tactics in the battle. While destroyers of IJN would not dash. Kurita told he was anxious about shortage of fuel of the destroyers, though Ugaki wrote the battleships should supply the destroyers with fuel. I do not think gun fires of battleships crashed the convoy if Kurita assalted the Leyte Bay. Because Nishimura's fleet had been destroyed, Kinkaid's fleet had half finished ammunition while Kurita chased 6 escort aircraft carriers of Taffy Three. I think he could intercept Kurita's hurt 4 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers and 2 destroyer squadrons. Actually aircraft of escort carriers had downed already 3 heavy cruisers of Chokai, Chikuma and Suzuya.
Ebina, p313
F4F, p53

Most of Japanese people criticized Kurita's decision to give up the assalt. I think they ignoring remained escort aircraft power. We remember 4 F4F stopped IJN amphious operation at the Wake Island. They write escort aircraft carriers of Task 77 were not equipped with torpedos or AP bombs and the aviators had not trained against surfaced vessels. I do not think so. We ignored USN ammunition and refuel ability on surface. How were the escort carriers really? Taffy 1 was in the south of Taffy 3. Thomas L. Sprague commanded Task Group 77.4 Escort Carrier Group.

    Taffy 1: Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague in Sangamon
    USS Sangamon (CVE-26) Early on 25 October, two flights took off: one toward the Mindanao Sea to locate and finish off Japanese survivors of the Battle of Surigao Strait, the other toward Leyte for CAP missions. About an hour later, Sangamon received word that Taffy 3, 120 miles (190 km) to the north. Within a half hour, Sangamon's CAP flight had been diverted to Samar and she had launched another smaller, group to further aid the attacked unit. Soon thereafter, however, at about 0740, as Taffy 1 planes were being recovered, rearmed, and launched, the unit became the target of the first strike of the kamikaze.

    Santee took the first hit, and as her flight and hangar decks blazed, Suwannee was attacked. Antiaircraft fire from that CVE scored on the planes, which then dived toward Sangamon. A 5-inch (130 mm) shell from Suwannee finished one plane only 50 yards (46 m) from Sangamon. By 0755, Japanese submarine I-56 (2) had joined the fight, and, as Santee's crew brought her fires under control, sent a torpedo into that luckless CVE. Minutes later, Suwannee was hit by a Zero forward of the after elevator.

    Later in the morning, as the attacks fell off, she sent medical personnel to assist casualties of the damaged ships, then began bringing them aboard for treatment. At mid-day, she suffered malfunctions in her steering gear, electrical generators, and catapult, but repairs were completed in time for her to launch afternoon strikes as scheduled.

    On 26 October, Sangamon recovered her scattered planes and again launched CAP flights. At 1215, however, enemy planes were reported coming in from the north. Several broke through the air defenses, and Suwanee suffered another kamikaze hit. On 29 October, the escort carriers retired.

    USS Suwannee (CVE-27) Suwannee was much farther south as an element of Rear Admiral Thomas Sprague's "Taffy 1". Consequently, she did not participate in the running surface battle off Samar. At 07:40 on the 25th, "Taffy 1" was jumped by land-based planes from Davao in the first deliberate suicide attack of the war. They hit the enemy, but he rolled over, dove at Suwannee and crashed her about 40 feet forward of the after elevator, opening a 10-foot hole in her flight deck. His bomb compounded the fracture when it exploded between the flight and hangar decks, tearing a 25-foot gash in the latter and causing a number of casualties. Within two hours, her flight deck was sufficiently repaired to enable the escort carrier to resume air operations. Suwanee's group fought off two more air attacks before 13:00; then steamed in a northeasterly direction to join Taffy 3 and launch futile searches for Kurita's rapidly retiring force. Just after noon on 26 October, another group of kamikazes jumped Taffy 1. A Zero crashed Suwanee's flight deck and careened into a torpedo bomber which had just been recovered. The two planes erupted upon contact as did nine other planes on her flight deck. The resulting fire burned for several hours, but was finally brought under control. The escort carriers put into Kossol Roads in the Palaus on 28 October, then headed for Manus for upkeep on 1 November.

    USS Chenango (CVE-28) Chenango was not in action waters during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, but returned 28 October to provide replacement aircraft to her victorious sister escort carriers, who had held the Japanese fleet off from Leyte. The next day, she sailed for overhaul at Seattle, Washington, until 9 February 1945.

    USS Santee(CVE-29) At 07:36 on 25 October, Santee launched five Avenger and eight Wildcat aircraft for an attack against Japanese surface units some 120 miles to the north. At 07:40, a Japanese plane made a suicide dive on Santee with an estimated 63 kilogram bomb, crashing through the flight deck and stopping on the hangar deck. At 07:56, a torpedo fired from a Japanese submarine struck the ship, causing flooding of several compartments and a six degree list. Emergency repairs were completed by 09:35.

    USS Petrof Bay (CVE-80) From 21 October through 24 October Petrof Bay launched Air Support Groups. Two special strikes from Petrof Bay joined in the air attack against these enemy ships. Four FM-2 Wildcats and six TBM Avengers were launched at 0724 to join a 0552 launch of four fighters redirected to attack the Japanese surface ships. At 0729, RADAR reported six Japanese Mitsubishi A6M Zeros closing on the formation. The ship went to General Quarters and so remained for the next 108 hours. Wildcats without enough fuel to return to Petrof Bay landed at Tacloban airfield where the received some friendly fire. Surviving Avengers landed on Fanshaw Bay of Taffy 3 and Ommaney Bay of Taffy 2 with less than ten gallons of fuel remaining. Only one torpedo plane and two fighters returned to Petrof Bay. Petrof Bay launched a final strike at 1530 to search for and attack the enemy then in retreat. After rendezvousing with other aircraft from the CVEs, the flight proceeded to San Bernardino Strait where it found and attacked a cruiser of the Mogami class, scoring two torpedo hits and one probable hit. These planes also landed at Tacloban Airfield when their fuel was inadequate to return to Petrof Bay. At 2232, one of the destroyers in the screen had a sound contact. A 90-degree emergency turn was made and almost immediately thereafter two torpedoes straddled Petrof Bay, one twenty yards on the port and the other passing under the overhang on the starboard side. Coolbaugh attacked with depth charges and was believed successful in destroying the submarine. On 26 October, the only remaining Japanese force within range of the CVE's aircraft was one light cruiser and four destroyers sighted in the Visayan Sea. Petrof Bay launched its only two remaining torpedo-bombers to participate in a strike against the five ships. One plane scored a hit with a 500 pound semi-armor piercing bomb and a near miss on the cruiser and strafed a destroyer which caught on fire and blew up.

    USS Saginaw Bay (CVE-82) As the Japanese Fleet closed, on 24 October, she was ordered to transfer her aircraft to other carriers and proceed to Morotai for replacements. Thus, she missed the Battle for Leyte Gulf. She rejoined her task unit on 28 October as it retired to Manus.

    Taffy2: Rear Admiral Felix B. Stump in Natoma Bay
    USS Manila Bay (CVE-61) Manila Bay launched two airstrikes during the enemy pursuit of Taffy 3 and two more as the Japanese retreated. At 0830, she sent four torpedo-laden TBM Avengers and a seven-plane escort to join the desperate fight. Three launched torpedoes at a battleship, probably Yamato, but they missed. The fourth plane launched her torpedo at a heavy cruiser, most likely Chikuma. It hit the ship to starboard near the fantail, forcing her out of control. The second strike an hour later by two Avengers resulted in one torpedo hit on the portside amidships against an unidentified battleship. As the Japanese ships broke off attack and circled off Samar, the airstrikes continued. At 1120, Manila Bay launched four Avengers, carrying 500 pound bombs, and four bombers from other carriers. Escorted by FM-2 Wildcats and led by Commander R. L. Fowler, they soon joined planes from other Taffy carriers. Shortly after 1230, some 70 planes surprised and attacked the retiring Center Force, strafing and bombing through intense antiaircraft fire. Manila Bay's bombers made a hit and two near misses on the lead battleship, probably Kong‘¦or Haruna. Manila Bay launched her final strike at 1245, strafing destroyers and getting two hits on a cruiser. Later that afternoon, Manila Bay's CAP intercepted a Japanese bomber-fighter strike about 50 miles north of Taffy 2. Her four fighters broke up the enemy formation, and with reinforcements drove off the attackers before they reached the carriers. Her planes continued to attack enemy ships the following day. Laden with rockets and bombs, one of her Avengers scored two hits on Kinu and several rocket hits on Uranami. Both ships sank about noon in the Visayan Sea after numerous air attacks. Manila Bay resumed air operations in support of Leyte ground forces on 27 October.

    USS Natoma Bay (CVE-62) At 07:02, "Taffy 2", 20 miles to the south-south-east, responded and by 0708 all available planes were en route. Those already dispatched on routine missions were recalled. In a running battle which ensued, the determination of self-sacrificing destroyers and destroyer escorts of "Taffy 3" and fighters and bombers of the three Taffies resulted in an almost unbelievable, but necessary, victory in the Battle off Samar. Ordered not to concentrate on any particular ship, but to cripple as many as possible, planes from Natoma Bay conducted two strikes against the enemy within an hour and a half. At 09:26 a third strike, with 500 pound SAP bombs in lieu of torpedoes, was launched. At 11:18, a fourth strike was sent off to push the maneuvering enemy away from Leyte Gulf, but with neither torpedoes nor armor piercing bombs aboard, the planes took off carrying only general purpose bombs and depth charges. At noon, Natoma Bay's fighters, launched previously for CAP, were landed, rearmed and sent up again. At 12:56 and at 15:08, the 5th and 6th strikes were launched to further pursue the enemy as it retreated toward San Bernardino Strait. Fighter planes, armed with 250 pound (113 kg) general purpose bombs, were among those dispatched with the last strike. The following morning, 26 October, Natoma Bay's planes, continuing to pound the enemy, assisted in the sinking of a light cruiser and her accompanying destroyer in the Visayan Sea and then resumed support of ground forces on Leyte.

    USS Kadashan Bay (CVE-76) Arriving there 21 October she immediately commenced raids and strikes in support of troops ashore. Four days later one of her patrol planes, piloted by Ensign Hans L. Jensen, sighted the Central Force of the Japanese fleet off Samar. After reporting his sighting he launched an unsupported attack against the leading cruiser, beginning the famous battle off Samar. The carrier's air group launched three fighter and three torpedo strikes against Kurita's force.

    USS Marcus Island (CVE-77) Beginning on 18 October, she launched airstrikes against enemy positions and during the next week, her pilots flew 261 target and air cover missions. One TBM Avenger put a torpedo into the portside aft of a heavy cruiser, probably Chikuma. Amidst intense antiaircraft fire, her fighters made repeated strafing runs against battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. Her planes joined in two strikes against the retreating Japanese ships that afternoon.

    USS Savo Island (CVE-78) On the morning of the 25th, an escort carrier force off Samar, "Taffy 3", some 20 miles to the north, reported a large enemy surface force. The escorts of Savo Island's group also came under fire for about 30 minutes, as the carrier launched a total of six strikes in a desperate and successful effort to protect herself and the other carriers from annihilation.

    USS Ommaney Bay (CVE-79) the escort carriers began launching air strikes in an effort to cripple as many of the approaching enemy force as possible. In the ensuing battle aircraft from Ommaney Bay contributed to the sinking of one Japanese cruiser and helped to damage a number of other warships. Ommaney Bay launched some six strikes that day.

At 0923 Yamato and Nagato of Kurita and others changed in the north. Haruna changed in the north at 0930. At 1120 Kincaid ordered Oldendorf intercept Japanese center force. Thomas L. Sprague kept 6 escort carriers of Taffy 2 and USS Sangamon, Santee and Petrof Bay of Taffy 1 avilable. If Kurita changed in the south at noon, the remained 3 heavy cruisers would drop out. The 4 hurted battleships would damage again. Only Yamato and Nagato would reach at the entracne accompanying destroyers. USN old battleships would intercept them in T formation. Although Kincaid knew the enemy from aircraft reconnaisance, Kurita did not see the enemy from the sky. Only Yamato could have entered Leyte. What could single battleship do under attack of aircraft and surrounding gunfire?

Japan had already lost 1,000 aircraft preparing for Syo-1. GF might had better stop the opration. If 7 battleships stayed in the south, USN pay attention, as Royal Navy was anxious for hiding Italian or German warships. IJN lost valuable destroyers of Michishio, Asagumo, Yamagumo, Hatsuzuki, Akizuki, Nowake in the battle of Leyte. How should IJN use battleships and cruisers in the late Pacific War? The battleships always ran escorted by destroyers because they were afraid of allied submrines and spent much fuel. None of Yamato, Nagato, Haruna, Ise and Hyuga stayed at Singapore after the Leyte Battle. Kure Arsenal repaired Yamato and Haruna, though it was short of materials of steel or welding gas in November 1944.

Biak to Morotai937km 292°
Morotai to Tacloban1,078km 340°
Escort aircarft carriers stayed off Leyte for 10 days. How did USAAF arrived at Tacloban? P-38s flew from Biak via Morotai to Tacloban. They depearted on 27 October. They stayed at Morotai to refuel overnight. They arrived over Leyte Island at about noon on 27 October.[6]

USAAF could not use Tachloban rainy bad weather enough. US Army suspended Mindro campaign for 10 days. The USN 3rd Fleet helped ground operation for 28 days longer than schedule and would rest in November.[7]

 Aviation fuel capacity in aircraft carriers
Aviation fuel capacity
USN Casablanca15,400t
USN Yorktown19,900t
Franklin D. Roosevelt
IJN Ryujo27,000t
HMS Ark Royal 22,000t
USN built a lot of escort aircraft carriers(CVE). It was thought these were not for combats because of its low speed. This table shows loaded gasoline of Casablanca and Ryujo. Ryujo ran at full speed and contributed to sink Hornet. Casablanca has much aircraft fuel. It means continueous operaion available. A aircraft consumed 300gal(1.1kL) for a flight. For example, FM-2 loaded 0.447kL and 0.44kL of 2 drop tanks (0.22kL). The total was 0.887kL.
Koei p.95
Ouchi p.113, p232
Ei-kubo no sinjitsu (1918-1941)

USS Kitty Hawk, CVA-63 loaded 7,828t for herself running and 5,882t for aircraft. The 5,882t is equivalent to 6,356kL
Kokubokan(Kubo) 4
Unit conversion

Aircarft fuel capacity of Ryujyo was smaller than Casablanca. And IJN always worried about shortage of oilers. Fuel capacity of USN FDR is too small, and Kitty Hawk is too large. I think both of the data are wrong.

Fuel tanks in Kwajalein Atoll
US Army built 2 tanks of 50,000 barrel and 14 tanks of 10,000 barrel after Mar 1944. The total was 190,000 barrel equivalent to 40,560kL
Gunzo, p.121 No.28

 Training aviators
IJN fleet carriers had to stay in a port while training aviators. They often trained offshore Shikoku. So aircraft carrier operations were impossible during the training term, though IJN Hosho trained carrier pilots. But USN prepared 2 sid-wheel aircraft carriers and adopted escort aircraft carriers for training aviators. USS Long Island trained aviators at San Diego in 1943.
USS Long Island(CVE-1)

USN developed CIC ( Combat Information Center ) in the Pacific War. Japanese aircraft carriers did not get CIC at last. I think because IJN did not get radars sufficent to detect altitude of flying targets in the end of the war and good VHF wiress telephones through 1943. The photos shows CIC of USS Independence (CVL-22)[5].

DeskPloting screenRadar scopeHatch

Notable fast aircraft carriers commissioned date till 1943
CommissionedNameLaid downNotable mission
1927Nov16Saratoga (CV-3)1920Sep25Raided Rabaul
1938May12Enterprise (CV-6)1934Jul16Tokyo raid:CAP
1941Aug08IJN Shoukaku1937Dec12Raided Pearl Harbor
1941Sep25IJN Zuikaku1938May25Raided Pearl Harbor
1941Oct20Hornet (CV-8)1939Sep25Tokyo raid
1942Dec31Essex (CV-9)1941Apr28Rabaul raid
1943Jan14Independence (CVL-22)1941May01Rabaul raid: CAP
1943Feb25Princeton (CVL-23)1941Jun02Rabaul raid
1943Mar31Belleau Wood (CVL-24)1941Aug11Air support on Baker Island
1943May24Bunker Hill (CV-17)1941Sep15Rabaul raid
1943May28Cowpens (CVL-25)1941Nov17Air strikes on Mille and Makin
1943Jun17Monterey (CVL-26)1941Dec29Strikes on Kavieng, New Ireland
1943Jul24Cabot (CVL-28)1942Mar16Strikes on Roi, Namur
1943Aug16Intrepid (CV-11)1941Dec01raided Kwajalein
1943Aug31Langley (CVL-27)1942Apr11Marshall Islands operation
1943Nov15San Jacinto (CVL-30)1942Oct26Marianas actions
1943Nov17Bataan (CVL-29)1942Aug31Supported the attack on Hollandia
1943Nov24Wasp (CV-18)1942Mar18close air support on Saipan
1943Nov29Hornet (CV-12)1942Aug03Air support in New Guinea

[1] q‹σ•κŠΝ‘ε–P no ‹›—‹ˆκ–{ no –½’† niyoru ’Ύ–v
[2] Morimoto, p330
[3] νŽž“ϊ–{€‘D(62)
[4] Goeikubo, p266
[5] USS Independence (CVL-22)
[6] Terrors of Tacloban Link decay
[7] Ouoka, p423, vol9
[11] Gunzo, p10-13 No.57
[12] Lexington

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