Desperate War of Japan in the Pacific
IJN did intelligence operation in the US, The US was the most important imaginary enemy. Miyazaki was an IJN officer and stayed at west coat of US, who was trapped by US agents and exiled out US in 1935. His espionage network was destroyed. Officer Tachibana was arrasted, when he tried making another espionage network later. Government agreed that both of Tachibana and Okada would not go to the US again.[3]

Yamaguchi Tamon
Yamaguchi Tamon organized espionage network in US, when he was a navel attache of Japanese embassy in 1935. He agreed with a German attache who cooperated each other.
Yamaguchi Tamon

Sanematsu Yuzuru
Sanematsu Yuzuru was a naval attache of Japanese embassy in Washington DC. He got an information in 1940. An attache of Italian Navy told him that RN might have 'a secret weapon' that warships could shoot in the dark midnight without a search light. He inquired an IJN officer in New York. The officer replied that battleships, aircraft carriers and heavy cruisers have such antennas on the top of the bridges.

He breathed a word about Japanese American's captivity, when the Pacific War broke out. IJN had built espionage network in US for a long time. He came back on a wartime exchange ship. On seeing lights of rooms of Ministry of IJN turn off at 6 pm, he also sighed, lights of Ministry of USN did not turned off till midnight.

Although Sanematsu of 3rd department of Gunreibu insisted that USN would invade Mariana, 1st section of operation misjudged. Gunreib admitted 3rd section was right on 30 January 1944.[4]

Signal Intelligence
IJN was picking up US signal on radio. The most concern was USAAF BG just before Pearl habor attack. These signals were listened at Oowada tsushintai of which troops was increased from 60 to 400 in the end of the war.

6th tsushintai of Martial Islands warned USN action before a day, when USS Enterprise and Yorktown air raided there on 1 February 1942. But head quater of 4th fleet pay no warning. Head quater of 6th Naval base at Truk Islands held a drinking party the day before.[6]

An intelligence officer of GF correctly thought USN operation would act Mariana. However, operation department of Gunreibu thought Biaku as main advancing route, so moved most of landing aircraft from Mariana to Palau etc.[7]

IJN could not decipher USN strip cipher, though IJN organized a special task group.[5] So IJN depended on signal intelligence. How could IJN signal intelligence predict USN operation? IJN gathered publicized information from broadcast, newspapapers and magazines. They contained newly launched aircraft carriers and battleships and damage and replenishment of US Army and Marines divisions. Section 5 analyzed these information, air raids, bombardment, telegrams and telegram lenght of submarines. Almost USN operaions were able to predict. Auxiliary officers from universities analyzed them.

Why did not IJN rely on signal intelligence?
Operation department of IJN did not trust the intelligence activity. Genda reflected that they were dogmatic. Simply I think that IJN chief commanders were less intelligent. They held meetings and heard staff opinions well, and adopted always opinion of operation department. That all. Staff like Genda controlled IJN operation after Yamamoto was assasinated. While USN chief commanders used HYPO and relied on the intelligence. IJN did not find that USN read IJN cipher till the end of the Pacific War.

US had studied orange plan since Japanese-Russo war. When Japan began to fight US, IJA had an old US war manual only. The manual described usage of horses on Marines' landing. Funny. While IJN gathered newly operation manuals of USN. Originally IJA's enemy had not been US but Russia. IJA intelligence had 3 divisions of Russia, China, and all others (Europe, America) in 1936. IJA did not think war against US in those days. IJA established Total War Institute at last in 1941. Sakai and Tatsumi insisted its necessity for 25 years. The institute simulated war against US. It was the same in real history except for Pearl Habor attack and nuke bombarding in August 1941.

Intelligence of Army General Staff Office against Russia and Germany were 5th section and 16th each. In fevering battle of Germany and Russia, both section argued in Sep 1942. the 5th analyzed numbers of freighters and aircraft via Siberia from US correct, and assured Germany would not win. 5th section had already informed advantage of Russia in August 1941[1].

Shiraki of 5th section assured in February 1945, Russia would will invade in August or September. But 2nd section of war operation controlled Army General Staff Office entirelly.

Suma Yakichiro
Journalism of Japan always codemn that MOFA was irresponsible to declare the War. Certainly the signal man got high rank after the war. But Nomura and Kurusu were responsible. After the Pacific War, Nomura acted like a US agent this time. IJN high ranked bureaucrats always has acted smart. I think that Nomura was a typical admiral of IJN. A lot of books writes how MOFA handled its ciphered secret documents badly. So MOFA publicizes that it read Chinese and US cipherd messages.

Suma Yakichiro ( 1892-1970 ) was a diplomat on China at first. Suma established cabinet intelligence department in 1937. He also established Tokikan in Japanese embassy of Spain in 1940. Suma hired a jewish Spanish as a chief who organized agents in Washington DC, NYC, LA, Sandiego, etc half a year later. Suma made espionage network in North America, Australia and Dakar in January 1941. The information was transfered via Mexico to Spain. The organization got information about nuke project. However, US read messages from embassy to Japan, two agents relative to the nuke test were killed by US official in the US.

Berg's passport
In 1934, players of MLB came to Japan. Japanese people enjoyed playing baseball games of MLB vs JPB. Hurler Sawamura Eiji's pitching was legend against Babe Ruth and Lou Gehrig. A catcher named Moe Berg ( 1902-1972 ) is very interested to me. He played only 3 games in Japan. He looked around and took photos of Japan. I have seen a photo of Nakajima Aircraft's railroad siding on a magazine. The cation of the photo was that someone took a photo on MLB tour in Japan. He also took a film over a view of houses on St. Luke's Hospital of Tokyo.[8] He visited the hospital for seeing a daughter of his friend or someone. Foreigners in Tokyo used the hospital. He became an agent of OSS in WWII. It seems the film was used to develop fire bombs. Some Japanese people believed a rumor that B-29s would not bomb over the Hospital, it was donated by US Christians.
Sugoi yatura ga yattekita

I was impressed that US focused to Japanese aircraft manufaturing. I understood that destroying of Musashino Seisakusyo of Nakajima was not a simple military target but a symbolic military target. Hansel of UAAF could not destroy the target. The target was destroyed by a USN air raid in a day. As matter of fact, production of aircraft of Musashino was very lowered by the factory evacuation. It was unlucky to Hansel.

The American Council on Japan (ACJ) was a small, loosely knit group organized in 1948 to reverse American policy in the Japanese occupation. Its spearhead was Harry F. Kern, foreign editor of Newsweek ; James Lee Kauffman, Eugene Dooman, former Ambassador Joseph Grew, and former Undersecretary of State William R. Castle were the organizers.

 USN & US Army
USN Japanese Language School
US Navy Japanese Language School was established at California Univ and Harvard Uiv in November 1941. The school moved Colorado Univ the next year because of Japanese American captivity. Edward George Seidensticker was a graduate of the school. USN adopted students majoring in Japanese literature. They became all intelligence officers.[9] John Stevens (1920-) is currently the most senior Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, who was one of USN cryptographers deciphered Yamamoto's last flight. Layton (1903-1984) and Rochefort (1898-1976) were excellent intelligence officers.

While Military Intelligence Service Language School adopted a lot of Japanese Americans as radio interceptors and interrogators.[9]

Oka Shohei (1909-1988) was an excellent scholar of French literature. Aida Yuji (1916-1997) was a western historian. Both were drafted as soldiers. IJA seems not to have used our intellecturals effectively. A lot of US students volunteered in breaking war at once. However, few Japanese students volunteered and the rest of them were enforced to draft in December 1943.

USN captured code books from sunk IJN submarine I-1 and I-124. I-124 was sunk in January 1942 near Port Darwin. While Tang ( SS-306 ) sank near Taiwan and USS Grenadier ( SS-210 ) sank near Penag, IJN might get a code book from them, but it failed.[11] US Marines invaded a coral of Makin from SS-168 Nautilus, one of aim was to capture code book. UK and US were very eager to steal code books or cipher machines of enemies, German and Japanese authors of war books refer to the fact. It reminds me of tradition since Walsingham ( 1532-1590 ).

A code book and an operation book called 'Z' of IJN happened to be in the hand of USN, when 2 Emily bailed out sea in March 1944, when staffs of the grand fleet were fleeing. IJN called its incident Otsu jiken.

F-13 flew over Japan and took more than 13,000 photos in 1944. Looking up them, Intelligence of 20th AAF found a factory of tetraethyl lead in a town[2]. The tetraethyl lead was material which US banned to export by embargo. It was used in gasoline as an anti-knocking agent. Intelligence of Washington informed the AAF a name of the town. Is it true? Simply US surveyed such information like intelligence activity of Moe Berg, I guess.

 Operation Snow
Russia approved Operation Snow in October 1940. John met White at a restaurant in Washington DC on 18 May 1941. John passed a note from Bill to White. The note was that US should action a far east policy. White was surprised to find that his approach was the same of Bill's. Russia could tell a message. White proposed a diplomatic policy about US-Japanese and US-Russian relation on 6 June. He proposed a draft about US-Japanese negotiation. The draft reached Hull and Roosevelt. The draft was an original type of Hull note. But there was another draft. Hull wondered White's general agreement or another temporary draft till 26. Hull and Roosevelt selected general agreement because Stimson reported information that a convoy of 5 IJA divisions ran in Indochina. Originally Army Intelligence judged this information usual supply. Some one changed the military information. White knew John via Bill. Bill was an illegal agent of Russia. He pretended an American scholar of China. An intellectual talked about China. That meant to talk about politics, economy, nation and peace in those days. Japanese leaders did not understand Americans' symapathy to China and sect or fear against facism, I think. Japanese people did not understand Chinese nationalism. People should have remembered Japanese nationalism to have reformed herself.
Gunzo, p173-177 No65

[1] Hori, p50-53
[2] B-29, p195
[3] Nakajima, p273
[4] Genda, p264-265
[5] Nakajima, p264
[6] Chihaya, p208-211
[7] Nakajima, p186-187
[8] St Luke's International Hospital
[9] Intelligence wo kaita IJA&N
[10] US Navy Japanese/Oriental Language School Archival Project
[11] Yoshida, p75

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